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Dependency and Termination Proceedings in
California-Standards of Proof
By David V Otterson*
Few interpersonal relationships have found greater protection in
the law than those between parents and their children.' Unfortunately,
the state must intervene into those relationships on occasion to protect
a child who has been the victim of parental neglect or abuse.2 In Cali-
fornia, the state may intercede on behalf of such children through two
distinct proceedings.3 Dependency proceedings are instituted to allow
a court to supervise the care and custody of mistreated children and
may ultimately result in the child being temporariy removed from the
home and placed in foster care.4 Termination proceedings, on the
other hand, permanenty sever the parent-child relationship and termi-
nate all parental rights,5 and are designed to free children for adoption
after they have been in foster care for prescribed periods of time. The
goal of this proceeding is not to punish erring parents, but rather to
liberate children who previously have been neglected or abused from
the insecurity inherent in foster care and to provide them with the sta-
* B.A., 1977, California State University at Chico. Member, Second Year Class.
1. "The integrity of the family unit has found protection in the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment, . . . the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, . . . and the Ninth Amendment . Stanley v. Illinois 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972)
(citations omitted).
2. As used in this Note, the term "neglect" refers to both intentional and unintentional
conduct on the part of a parent or parents which is alleged to have brought about some type
of harm to a child.
3. There are, however, at least eight different types of child custody proceedings in
California. See Bodenheimer, The Multiplicity of Child Custody Proceedings-Problems of
Calfornia Law, 23 STAN. L. REv. 703 (1971).
4. As used in this Note, the term "foster care" refers to a system of care and supervi-
sion outside the child's home, whether provided by a foster family, group home, or residen-
tial care facility.
5. Parental rights include the right to "possession" of the child, to visit, to determine
nationality and domicile, to choose the child's name, to control education, religious upbring-
ing and medical treatment, to consent or withhold consent to the child's adoption or mar-
riage, and to appoint a legal guardian to act in the child's behalf. Parental rights also
include the right to the child's services and, in some cases, support. See Eekelaar, Ifhat are
ParentalRightd), 89 LAW Q. Rav. (1973).
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bility of an adoptive home.6
Dependency proceedings commence in the juvenile court by the
filing of a petition to declare a child a dependent of that court pursuant
to California Welfare and Institutions Code section 300.7 If the factual
allegations of the petition are proven, the child is deemed within the
court's dependency jurisdiction.8 The court may then make any order
necessary to protect the child, including an order for temporary re-
moval of the child from the home and placement in foster care.9 The
court may only make such an order, however, if it has first made a
finding that the child's welfare requires his removal' ° or that returning
the child would be "detrimental" to the child."l Once a child is taken
from the home and placed in foster care, such care may continue as
long as the circumstances which led to the removal continue to exist.' 2
When a child has been subject to the juvenile court's jurisdiction
for a prescribed period of time and the parents have not yet rehabili-
tated themselves, or if the parents are "unfit" because of mental illness,
mental deficiency, or the heinous nature of their past criminal acts, ter-
mination proceedings may be instituted by the filing of a petition in
Superior Court pursuant to Civil Code section 232.' 3 Before parental
rights may be terminated and the parent-child relationship perma-
nently severed, the petitioner must prove both the factual allegations of
the petition and that returning the child to the parents would be "detri-
mental" to the child. 14
In recent years, a dispute has arisen in the California courts of
appeal over the proper standards of proof to be applied in making the
factual determinations under either Welfare and Institutions Code sec-
tion 300 or Civil Code section 232.15 Some courts have stated that the
standard of proof necessary to prove that a child falls within the provi-
sions of either of those statutes is the normal civil standard' 6 of "by a
preponderance of the evidence";' 7 others have held the more stringent
6. See text accompanying notes 145-46 infra.
7. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 300 (West Supp. 1978). For the text of this statute, see
note 25 infra.
8. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 355 (West Supp. 1978).
9. Id. § 362.
10. Id. §§ 361,726.
11. See CAL. CIv. CODE § 4600 (West Supp. 1978).
12. A yearly hearing is held to determine whether the court should continue to main-
tain its jurisdiction over the child. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 366 (West Supp. 1978).
13. CAL. CIv. CODE § 232 (West Supp. 1978). For text of this statute see note 88 infra.
14. See notes 97-98 & accompanying text infra.
15. See notes 47-50, 109-10 & accompanying text infra.
16. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 115 (West 1966).
17. The most accepted meaning of the expression "by a preponderance of the evi-
dence" is evidence which leads the trier of fact to find that the existence of the contested fact
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"clear and convincing evidence"' 8 standard applicable. 19
It is important that this dispute be resolved. Specific legal stand-
ards are necessary to insure that adjudicatory procedures are not ap-
plied arbitrarily and to reduce the potential for such abuses of judicial
discretion.20 The Supreme Court of California recently expressed its
concern that prescribed standards be applied to procedures where chil-
dren are subject to removal from their homes because, the court stated,
"[W]here fundamental rights are affected by the exercise of discretion
by the trial court, we recognize that such discretion can only be truly
exercised if there is no misconception by the trial court as to the legal
basis for its action." 2'
In order to achieve a systematic and sensible process for state in-
tervention on behalf of a neglected or abused child, the standards of
proof for the termination of parental rights must be consistent with the
standards used to adjudge a child a dependent of the court and tempo-
rarily remove the child from the home.22 This Note analyzes and com-
pares Welfare and Institutions Code section 300 and Civil Code section
232 and, in doing so, attempts to expose misconceptions which have led
to substantial judicial confusion over the proper standards- of proof
necessary to support findings made pursuant to these statutes. A case
by case analysis shows that much of this confusion results from the
appellate courts' failure to evaluate critically the reasoning of earlier
cases which, in certain instances, were litigated under circumstances
clearly distinguishable from those being reviewed.
The discussion will demonstrate that despite judicial interpreta-
tions to the contrary, neither the practical application of section 300 or
section 232, nor prevailing social policies support the conclusion that
higher than normal evidentiary standards are required to make the fac-
tual determinations required by these statutes. Finally this Note sug-
is more probable than its nonexistence. C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF Evi-
DENCE 794 (2d ed. 1972).
18. Clear and convincing evidence is that which would persuade the trier of fact that
"the truth of the fact is not merely more probable than not, but highly probable." Id. at 795.
19. See notes 47-50, 109-10 & accompanying text infra.
20. Wald, State Intervention on Behaf of "Neglected" Children: Standards/or Removal
of Children From 7heir Homes, Monitoring the Status of Children in Foster Care, and Termi-
nation of Parental Rights, 28 STAN. L. REv. 623, 639-641 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Wald].
21. In re Carmaleta B., 21 Cal. 3d 482, 496, 579 P.2d 514, 523, 146 Cal. Rptr. 623, 632
(1978).
22. Wald, supra note 20, at 628. In re Jacqueline H., 21 Cal. 3d 170, 175, 557 P.2d 683,
686, 145 Cal. Rptr. 548, 551 (1978) notes that Welfare and Institutions Code § 300 and Civil
Code § 232 are "closely analogous", and cites several cases where, because of their similar
objectives, "Welfare and Institutions Code section 300 and related provisions have been
used to clarify ambiguities in the language and procedures of section 232."
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gests some proposals for legislative reform to more fully protect each of
the competing interests in those proceedings of state intervention.
The Dependency Proceeding
Whenever a peace officer has reasonable cause to believe a child
has been a victim of parental neglect, abuse or abandonment, that of-
ficer may, without a warrant, take the child into temporary protective
custody.23 The officer may then, in his discretion, either release the
child, serve notice on both the parent and the child to appear before the
county probation department, or turn the child over to the probation
department for further processing. 24 If the child is sent to the probation
department, a probation officer is required to conduct an investigation
into the circumstances leading to the child's removal. Unless the inves-
tigation reveals that the child falls within the provisions of Welfare and
Institutions Code section 300,25 the probation officer must return the
child to the parents. A child will fall within one of the descriptive cate-
gories of that statute if found to be "in need of proper parental care or
control;1 26 "destitute" or without "a home or suitable place of
23. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 305 (West Supp. 1978). Children who are removed
are usually placed in Juvenile Hall or some other institutional detention facility (which usu-
ally operates under a euphemistic name such as "Youth Guidance Center" or "Dependent
Shelter"). Thereafter, attempts are made to place such children, especially younger children,
in short term care with foster families. CAL. LEGIS., ASSEMBLY OFFICE OF RESEARCH, CALI-
FORNIA CHILDREN-WHO CARES? A PROGRESS REPORT ON THE CALIFORNIA ASSEMBLY
SYMPOSIUM ON SERVICES TO CHILDREN AND YOUTH, X-25 to 26 (1974) [hereinafter cited as
CALIFORNIA CHILDREN-WHO CARES?].
24. CAL. WELE. & INST. CODE § 307 (West Supp. 1978).
25. Id. § 309. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 300 (West Supp. 1978) provides that:
"Any person under the age of 18 years who comes within any of the following
descriptions is within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court which may adjudge such
person to be a dependent of the court:
"(a) Who is in need of proper and effective parental care or control and has
no parent or guardian, or has no parent or guardian willing to exercise or capable
of exercising such care or control, or has no parent actually exercising such care or
control. No parent shall be found to be incapable of exercising proper and effec-
tive parental care or control solely because of a physical disability, including, but
not limited to, a defect in the visual or auditory functions of his or her body, unless
the court finds that the disability prevents the parent from exercising such care or
control.
"(b) Who is destitute, or who is not provided with the necessities of life, or
who is not provided with a home or suitable place of abode.
"(c) Who is physically dangerous to the public because of a mental or physi-
cal deficiency, disorder or abnormality.
"(d) Whose home is an unfit place for him by reason of neglect, cruelty,
depravity, or physical abuse of either of his parents, or of his guardian or other
person in whose custody or care he is."
26. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 300(a) (West Supp. 1978).
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abode;" 27 physically dangerous to society because of physical or mental
impairment;28 or neglected or abused.29
In the event a child fits one of the statutory descriptions, the pro-
bation officer has two alternative courses of action. If the investigation
reveals that the interests of the child may be served without further
detention, the probation officer may return the child to the home upon
agreement by the family to undergo temporary supervision by the pro-
bation department.30 If, however, the probation officer discovers that
the child's safety requires that the child remain in protective custody,
the probation officer must, within forty-eight hours of the initial re-
moval, file a petition with the juvenile court to declare the child a de-
pendent of the court.3 1 Within one day after filing such a petition, a
"detention hearing" must be held in the juvenile court to determine
whether the child's welfare mandates that the child remain in protec-
tive custody pending the outcome of the dependency proceedings or
whether the child may safely be returned home.32
Regardless of the outcome of the detention hearing, a further hear-
ing will be held later to determine whether the court may invoke its
jurisdiction to declare the minor a dependent child.33 This proceeding
requires the courts to determine whether the child fits one of the pre-
scribed "descriptions" of Welfare and Institutions Code section 300 as
alleged in the petition. 34 It is important to bear in mind that depen-
dency proceedings are bifurcated; section 300 applies exclusively to the
jurisdictional phase of the proceeding, 35 while other statutes govern the
dispositional stage. 36 If the petitioner is unable to affirmatively show
that the child meets one of the descriptions of section 300, the petition
27. Id. § 300(b).
28. Id. § 300(c).
29. Id. § 300(d).
30. Id. § 330. Services rendered by the Dependency Supervision worker include refer-
ral to local psychiatric and mental health counseling, group therapy, medical treatment, and
parenting classes. The goal of such services is to maintain a unified natural family, resolve
existing problems and avoid further problem situations. CALIFORNIA CHILDREN-WHO
CARES?, supra note 22, at X-35.
31. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 313 (West Supp. 1978).
32. Id. § 315. At this hearing, unless it is found that further detention is "a matter of
immediate and urgent necessity for the protection of the minor," or unless some other statu-
tory grounds for ordering continued detention are found the court must return the child to
the parents. Id. § 319.
33. Id. § 334. This section provides that the jurisdictional hearing must be held no
later than 15 days after removal from the home, or within 30 days if the child has not been
removed.
34. Id. § 355.
35. Id.
36. Id. §§ 361-362. See also CAL. CIV. CODE § 4600 (West Supp. 1978).
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must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction and the child returned
home.37 A child who comes within the provisions of the statute, how-
ever, will be adjudged a dependent of the court.38 The court will "then
proceed to hear evidence on the question of the proper disposition to be
made of the minor."' 39 After hearing all the pertinent evidence, the
judge or referee may allow the parents to retain or regain custody of
the child if the parents agree to supervision by the probation depart-
ment.40 If the court deems it necessary to remove a child who is not
currently placed in protective custody, the court must first make a
separate finding that the "welfare of the minor" requires his removal.4'
In situations where the child is in protective custody, a similar finding
must be made under Civil Code section 460042 that returning the child
to his parents would be "detrimental" to the child.
Standards of Proof
The burden of proof at both the jurisdictional and dispositional
stages of the dependency proceeding is on the state.43 The standard of
proof which must be adduced to support a finding of jurisdiction under
Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, as prescribed by statute, 44 is
"a preponderance of the evidence." Nonetheless, at least three recent
cases have cast doubt on the propriety of that standard.45 The standard
37. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 356 (West Supp. 1978).
38. Id. § 360.
39. Id. §§ 356, 358.
40. Id. § 362.
41. Id. § 361; see id. § 726.
42. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4600 (West Supp. 1978) provides, in part:
"In any proceeding where there is at issue the custody of a minor child, the
court may, during the pendency of the proceeding or at any time thereafter, make
such order for the custody of such child during his minority as may seem necessary
or proper ....
"Before the court makes any order awarding custody to a person or persons
other than a parent, without the consent of the parents, it shall make a finding that
an award of custody to a parent would be detrimental to the child and the award to
a nonparent is required to serve the best interests of the child."
For a discussion of the statute, see Porter & Walsh, The Evolution of Caifornia's Child
Custody Laws: A Question of Statutory Interpretation, 7 Sw. U.L. REV. 1 (1975); Note, Cali-
fornia Custody Awards to Nonparents: A View of Civil Code Section 4600, 2 PEPPERDINE L.
REV. 458 (1975).
43. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 355, 701 (West Supp. 1978).
44. Id.
45. In re Fred J., 89 Cal. App. 3d 168, 152 Cal. Rptr. 327 (1979); In re Christopher B.,
82 Cal. App. 3d 608, 147 Cal. Rptr. 390 (1978); In re Robert P., 61 Cal. App. 3d 310, 132
Cal. Rptr. 5 (1976), appeal dismissed sub. nom. Potter v. Department of Social Servs., 431
U.S. 911 (1976).
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of proof required to make the finding of "detriment" under Civil Code
section 4600 is not prescribed by statute, but it is widely accepted that
the standard of proof is by clear and convincing evidence.4 6
Since 1976, four California Court of Appeal decisions have dis-
cussed the standards of proof involved in dependency proceedings. 47
Of these, only one case held that a "preponderance" standard should
be uniformly applied to invoke jurisdiction under Welfare and Institu-
tions Code section 300.48 Two other cases held that the standard of
proof at the jurisdictional stage of the proceeding depends upon
whether or not the child might be removed from the home at the dispo-
sitional stage.49 The earliest case, In re Robert P. ,50 held that clear and
convincing evidence is required to make the jurisdictional finding.
Much of the confusion which abounds in the more recent court
opinions dealing with proper evidentiary standards in removal pro-
ceedings has evolved from the In re Robert P. decision. In that case, a
petition 5' was filed to declare two-year old Robert P. a dependent of
the court on the grounds that he had been neglected52 by his teenaged
mother and that he had not been provided with a suitable home.53
There was testimony at the juvenile court that the motel room in which
Robert lived with his mother was filthy and littered with empty beer
and wine bottles and stank of spoiled food. The only edible food in the
room was a can of condensed milk. Robert apparently slept on a dirty
mattress which was shoved under a bureau during the day. Several
witnesses also testified that Robert's mother had developed a pattern of
leaving Robert with friends or casual acquaintences and then disap-
pearing for days at a time.
The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, reversed
the order of the juvenile court placing the child in temporary foster
46. See, e.g., In re Terry D., 83 Cal. App. 3d 890, 898, 147 Cal. Rptr. 221, 225 (1978); In
re Christopher B., 82 Cal. App. 3d 608, 617, 147 Cal. Rptr. 390, 395 (1978); In re Cynthia
K., 75 Cal. App. 3d 81, 84-86, 141 Cal. Rptr. 875, 877-78 (1977).
47. In re Fred J., 89 Cal. App. 3d 168, 152 Cal. Rptr. 327 (1979); In re Christopher B.,
82 Cal. App. 3d 608, 147 Cal. Rptr. 390 (1978); In re Lisa D., 81 Cal. App. 3d 192, 146 Cal.
Rptr. 178 (1978); In re Robert P., 61 Cal. App. 3d 310, 132 Cal. Rptr. 5 (1976), appeal dis-
missed sub. nom. Potter v. Department of Social Servs., 431 U.S. 911 (1976).
48. In re Robert P., 61 Cal. App. 3d 310, 132 Cal. Rptr. 5 (1976), appeal dismissed sub.
nom. Potter v. Department of Social Servs., 431 U.S. 911 (1976).
49. In re Fred J., 89 Cal. App. 3d 168, 152 Cal. Rptr. 327 (1970); In re Christopher B.,
82 Cal. App. 3d 608, 147 Cal. Rptr. 390 (1978).
50. In re Robert P., 61 Cal. App. 3d 310, 132 Cal. Rptr. 5 (1976), appeal dismissed sub.
nom. Potter v. Department of Social Servs., 431 U.S. 911 (1976).
51. The petition was filed pursuant to CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 600 (current version
at CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 300 (West Supp. 1978)).
52, CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 300(d) (West Supp. 1978).
53. Id. § 300(b).
July 1979]
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
care because the juvenile court failed to make a finding of "detriment"
under Civil Code section 4600. The appellate court also held that, de-
spite the unequivocal statutory mandate that the standard of proof re-
quired to invoke dependency jurisdiction is the "preponderance"
standard 5 4 the decision of the California Supreme Court in In re
B. G.5  and that of the federal court in Alsager v. District Court of Polk
County, Iowa56 required the more stringent "clear and convincing"
standard to be applied. The holding of In re Robert P., however, un-
necessarily goes beyond either that of B. G. or Alsager by requiring
clear and convincing evidence in situations where it is not mandated by
either of the latter cases.57
In re B . 58 involved a custody dispute between B.G.'s mother and
his foster parents. B.G. and his sister, ages five and six, respectively, at
the time a dependency petition 59 was brought, were born in Czechoslo-
vakia. Their father fled the country with his two children shortly after
the 1968 Soviet occupation. The children's mother neither consented to
their departure from the country, nor was she even aware of it until she
arrived home from work on the day that they left. Shortly after arriv-
ing in California, the father died and the children were declared depen-
dents of the court and placed in foster care. When the mother arrived
in this country two years later seeking to regain custody of her children,
the juvenile court held that it would not be in the "best interests" of the
children to return them to their mother. The California Supreme Court
reversed, 60 holding that a "best interests" test 61 would not suffice in
making a dispositional order placing a child in the custody of a
54. 61 Cal. App. 3d at 317 n.5, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 9. The footnote refers to the standard
of proof required by Welfare and Institutions Code § 701, which deals with both wardship
and dependency proceedings. Section 355, which deals exclusively with dependency pro-
ceedings, was enacted in 1976. Cal. Stat. (1976), ch. 1068, § 9, at 4769. Both statutes require
a "preponderance" standard.
55. 11 Cal. 3d 679, 523 P.2d 244, 114 Cal. Rptr. 444 (1974).
56. 406 F. Supp. 10 (S.D. Iowa 1975), a~ff'dper curiam, 545 F.2d 1137 (8th Cir. 1976).
57. For a good discussion of this "misplaced reliance" in the Robert P. decision, see
Note, Dependency Proceedings: What Standard of Proof' An Argument Against the Standard
of "Clear and Convincing", 14 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 1155, 1158 (1977).
58. 11 Cal. 3d 679, 523 P.2d 244, 114 Cal. Rptr. 444 (1974).
59. The petition was brought pursuant to former CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 600 (cur-
rent version at CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 300 (West Supp. 1978)).
60. It Cal. 3d 679, 523 P.2d 244, 144 Cal. Rptr. 444 (1974).
61. This test was first clearly enunciated in Finlay v. Finlay, 240 N.Y. 429, 148 N.E.
624 (1925). By 1968 it had gained almost universal recognition by the courts. H. CLARK,
THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 172 (1968). In recent years,
however, the test has come under increasing criticism. See Wald, supra note 20, at 649-50;
Note, In the Child's Best Interests: Rights of the Natural Parents in Child Placement Proceed-
ings, 51 N.Y.U. L. REV. 446, 456-58 (1976); Note, State Intrusion into Family Affairs: Justi-
cations and Limitations, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1383, 1390-94.
[Vol. 30
nonparent. Instead, the court held that an award of custody of a child
to a nonparent against the claim of a parent, could be made only "upon
a clear showing that such award is essential to avert harm to the
child."'62 The court noted that the adoption of Civil Code section 4600
reflected a legislative intent to shift judicial attention from the "fitness"
of the parent to the effect upon the child of leaving him with his parents
and required "a finding that an award of custody to a parent would be
detrimental to the child." 63
The court of appeal seized upon the phrase "clear showing," and
in its opinion in In re Robert P. 64 held:
While in In re B. G., our Supreme Court was not explicitly dealing
with the proper standard of proof to be applied pursuant to a section
[300] proceeding, the language quoted above is susceptible to the rea-
sonable interpretation that clear and convincing evidence is the
proper standard of proof pursuant to both section [300] and Civil
Code section 4600.65
Thus, without explicitly invalidating the statutory "preponder-
ance" standard required to make findings under section 300, the Robert
P. court expanded B. G. to require the application of the clear and con-
vincing standard not only to a dispositional finding made under Civil
Code section 4600, but also to the jurisdictional phase of the depen-
dency proceeding. To further support its holding that clear and con-
vincing evidence is required to make a finding under Welfare and
Institutions Code section 300, the court relied heavily on Alsager v. Dis-
trict Court of Polk County, Iowa.66 In Alsager, a petition, filed pursu-
ant to section 232.41 of the Code of Iowa 67 to free five of the six Alsager
62. 11 Cal. 3d at 698-99, 523 P.2d at 258, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 458 (emphasis added).
63. Id. at 697, 523 P.2d at 257, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 457. In analyzing the legislative intent
behind § 4600, the court quoted from the Assembly Journal: "'The importantpoint is that the
intent of the Legislature is that the court consider parental custody to be highly preferable.
Parental custody must be clearly detrimental to the child before custody can be awarded to a
nonparent."' (emphasis in original). Id.
64. 61 Cal. App. 3d 310, 132 Cal. Rptr. 5 (1976).
65. Id. at 318, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 10.
66. 406 F. Supp. 10 (S.D. Iowa 1975), af'dper curiam, 545 F.2d. 1137 (8th Cir. 1976).
For a critical analysis of the case, see Day, Termination of Parental Rights Statutes and the
Voidfor Vagueness DoctrineA Successful Attack on the Parens Patriae Rationale, 16 J. FAM.
L. 213 (1978).
67. At the time the petition was filed the provision read in pertinent part:
"The court may upon petition terminate the relationship between parent and child:
2. If the court finds that one or more of the following conditions exist:
(b) That the parents have substantially and continuously or repeatedly refused to
give the child necessary parental care and protection.
July 1979] TERMINATION PROCEEDINGS
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children from their parents' custody and control, was granted by a state
court. The petition had alleged that the parents were "unfit" under
subdivision 2(b) of the statute and had refused to give the children
"necessary parental care and protection" under subdivision 2(d).
Three years after the order of the trial court was entered, the parents
sought in federal district court a declaratory judgment that the Iowa
termination statute was unconstitutionally vague.
Granting declaratory relief after remand from the Court of Ap-
peals for the Eighth Circuit, 68 the district court found the Iowa statute
unconstitutional on the grounds that its vagueness constituted a viola-
tion of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. 69
The Alsager court further held, after analogizing the rights in-
volved in a termination proceeding to the rights at stake in an involun-
tary civil commitment where clear and convincing evidence is
required,70 that "the fundamental right to family integrity deserves an
equal standard." 7 ' Interestingly, the court supported this holding by
making the observation that, unlike California, Iowa required, by stat-
ute,72 a standard of clear and convincing evidence in dependency adju-
dications and, thus "[t]he state would not be unduly burdened to treat
parental termination adjudications in a similar fashion." 73
While the court in In re Robert P. 74 recognized the differences be-
(d) That the parents are unfit by reason of debauchery, intoxication, habitual use
of narcotic drugs, repeated lewd and lascivious behavior, or other conduct found
by the court likely to be detrimental to the physical or mental health or morals of
the child." IOWA CODE § 232.41(2) (1969) (repealed by 1976 Iowa Acts (66 G.A.)
ch. 1229, § 38, eff. Jan. 1, 1977).
68. Alsager v. District Court of Polk County, Iowa, 518 F.2d 1160 (8th Cir. 1975). In
their initial appearance before the federal courts, the Alsagers were denied declaratory re-
lief. Alsager v. District Court of Polk County, Iowa, 384 F. Supp. 643 (S.D. Iowa 1975).
69. 406 F. Supp. at 15. The court also held that due process requires the state to "show
that the consequences, in harm to the children, of allowing the parent-child relationship to
continue, are more severe than the consequences of termination." Id. at 23: accord, Roe v.
Conn, 417 F. Supp. 769 (M.D. Ala. 1976). This requirement very nearly parallels that of
"detriment" mandated by In re B.G.
The application of the Iowa termination statute was also violative of due process, ac-
cording to the district court, because of the state's failure to pursue "less drastic" alternatives
to termination, namely by obtaining temporary protective custody through a dependency
proceeding. 406 F. Supp. at 21-22.
70. 406 F. Supp. at 25 (citing Lynch v. Baxley, 386 F. Supp. 378 (M.D. Ala. 1974)).
71. Id.; accord, Sims v. State Dep't of Public Welfare, 438 F. Supp. 1179 (S.D. Tex.
1977); Roe v. Conn, 417 F. Supp. 77 (M.D. Ala. 1976).
72. IOWA CODE § 232.31 (repealed by 1976 Iowa Acts (66 G.A.) ch. 1229 § 38, eff. Jan.
1, 1977).
73. 406 F. Supp. at 25. The Iowa statutory scheme is relevant because in California a
statutory "preponderance" standard is used to prove that a child comes within the juvenile
court's dependency jurisdiction. See note 44 & accompanying text, supra.
74. 61 Cal. App. 3d. 310, 318, 132 Cal. Rptr. 5 (1976).
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tween the Iowa termination statute in Asager and California depen-
dency proceedings under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300,75
the court apparently did not consider them significant enough to affect
its decision. Perhaps the most critical difference between the Iowa stat-
ute and California's section 300, is that the Iowa statute allowed sum-
mary termination upon the mere finding of neglect by a preponderance
of the evidence, which, as the court in A/sager pointed out, violated the
parents' due process rights.76 In California, however, there are added
safeguards to insure the parents due process. Not only must the peti-
tioner in a California dependency proceeding prove by a preponder-
ance of the evidence that the child has been neglected, abused, or
abandoned, but also he must make a "clear showing" that returning the
child to the parents would be "detrimental" to the child's welfare.77
Although the First Appellate District has gained considerable fol-
lowing for its holding in Robert P. that the "clear showing" language of
B. G mandates a standard of clear and convincing evidence to be ap-
plied to Civil Code section 4600,78 its conclusion that such a standard is
also necessary to make the simple finding of dependency jurisdiction
under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300 has not been widely
accepted.
The Third District has failed to resolve the issue despite two recent
attempts. In In re Christopher B. ,79 the court held:
We are of the opinion the clear and convincing proof is required
only when the final result is to sever the parent-child relationship
and award custody to a nonparent. We do not believe the clear and
convincing proof is required when the court is simply making the
determination of dependency under section 300.80
While the opinion is not clear in regard to the stage at which it
would require clear and convincing evidence, a more recent decision by
the court has resolved that ambiguity. In In re FredJ,81 the court held
that the clear and convincing standard is required "in a section 300
hearing that may result in removal of a child from its parents. '8 2 The
problem with this conclusion should appear obvious. Since, by stat-
75. Id. at 318, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 10.
76. 406 F. Supp. at 25.
77. CAL. CIv. CODE § 4600 (West Supp. 1978).
78. See, e.g., hnre Terry D., 83 Cal. App. 3d 890,898, 148 Cal. Rptr. 221, 225 (1978); In
re Christopher B., 82 Cal. App. 3d 608, 617, 147 Cal. Rptr. 390, 395 (1978); In re Cynthia
K., 75 Cal. App. 3d 81, 84-86, 141 Cal. Rptr. 875, 877-78 (1977).
79. 82 Cal. App. 3d 608, 147 Cal. Rptr. 390 (1978).
80. Id. at 617, 147 Cal. Rptr. at 395.
81. 89 Cal. App. 3d 168, 152 Cal. Rptr. 327 (1979).
82. Id. at 174, 152 Cal. Rptr. at 329 (emphasis added).
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ute,8 3 the juvenile court may make "any and all reasonable orders" at
the disposition stage of the dependency proceeding, every dependency
adjudication "may result" in removal if, in the sound discretion of the
court, such removal is justified. Basing the standard of proof to be ap-
plied at the jurisdictional stage of the proceeding on what the disposi-
tional order might be, requires the judge to not only presuppose the
facts and evidence that will be presented at the disposition hearing, but
also to effectively predetermine what the dispositional order will be.
In In re Lisa D. ,84 the Second District presents what is perhaps the
best analysis of the issue of the proper standard of proof under Welfare
and Institutions Code section 300. In confronting the holding of In re
Robert P., the court recognized that a requirement of clear and con-
vincing evidence at both the jurisdictional and dispositional stages of
the dependency proceeding is a misapplication of the supreme court's
holding in In re B.G.:
The discussion of In re (Robert) P.... sets up a strawman.
There the court was concerned with the standard of proof necessary
to support an award of custody to a nonparent against the claim of a
parent which, under the holding in In re B.G. . . ., could be done
only upon a clear showing that such an award was essential to avert
harm to the child. Here, the trial court was simply talking about the
standard of proof necessary to support the factual allegations of de-
pendency under section 300 of the Welfare and Institutions Code
which, under section 355 of the same code is "proof by a preponder-
ance of evidence ..... . . Questions concerning a more stringent
standard do not arise until a finding of dependency results in a dispo-
sition which severs the parental-child relationship either temporarily
or permanently.8 5
By a careful reading of In re B.G. and Civil Code section 4600, it
becomes readily apparent that, as pointed out in In re Lisa D., it is the
dispositional finding of "detriment" which requires clear and convinc-
ing evidence, not the mere finding of jurisdiction. Section 4600 pro-
vides that the detriment finding is required "[b]efore the court makes
any order awarding custody to a person" other than a parent.86 Simi-
larly, the discussion of the detriment requirement in the B. G. opinion
comes under the subheading "The Dispositional Order".87 As recog-
nized in In re Lisa D., neither the legislature nor the supreme court
intended a higher than normal standard of proof to be applied to make
a finding pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 300.
83. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 361, 362 (West Supp. 1978).
84. 81 Cal. App. 3d 191, 146 Cal. Rptr. 178 (1978).
85. Id. at 196, 146 Cal. Rptr. 178 (1978).
86. CAL. CIv. CODE § 4600 (West Supp. 1978).
87. 11 Cal. 3d at 693, 523 P.2d at 254, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 454.
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While the effects of In re Robert P. will not be totally nullified
until the issues raised are finally decided by the California Supreme
Court, it seems apparent that the only sound view is to reaffirm the
statutory "preponderance" standard in findings under Welfare and In-
stitutions Code section 300. Unfortunately, the Robert P. decision has
also caused substantial confusion as to the proper standard of proof
necessary in termination proceedings instituted under Civil Code sec-
tion 232.
The Termination Proceeding
Proceedings to declare a child permanently free from parental cus-
tody and control are in some ways quite similar to dependency pro-
ceedings. Like Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, Civil Code
section 23288 allows a petition to be brought if the child fits one of
88. CAL. CIV. CODE § 232 (West Supp. 1978) provides:
"(a) An action may be brought for the purpose of having any person under
the age of 18 years declared free from the custody and control of either or both of
his parents when such person comes within any of the following descriptions:
"(1) Who has been left without provision for his identification by his parent
or parents or by others or has been left by both of his parents or his sole parent in
the care and custody of another for a period of six months or by one parent in the
care and custody of the other parent for a period of one year without any provision
for his support, or without communication from such parent or parents, with the
intent on the part of such parent or parents to abandon such person. Such failure
to provide identification, failure to provide, or failure to communicate shall be
presumptive evidence of the intent to abandon. Such person shall be deemed and
called a person abandoned by the parent or parents abandoning him. If in the
opinion of the court the evidence indicates that such parent or parents have made
only token efforts to support or communicate with the child, the court may declare
the child abandoned by such parent or parents ...
:, * *
"(2) Who has been cruelly treated or neglected by either or both of his par-
ents, if such person has been a dependent of the juvenile court, and such parent or
parents deprived of his custody for the period of one year prior to the filing of a
petition praying that he be declared free from the custody and control of such cruel
or neglectful parents.
"(3) Whose parent or parents suffer a disability because of the habitual use
of alcohol, or any of the controlled substances specified in Schedules I to V, inclu-
sive, of Division 10 (commencing with Section 11000) of the Health and Safety
Code, except when such controlled substances are used as part of a medically pre-
scribed plan, or are morally depraved, if such person has been a dependent child of
the juvenile court, and the parent or parents deprived of his custody because of
such disability or moral depravity, for the period of one year continuously immedi-
ately prior to the filing of the petition praying that he be declared free from the
custody and control of such parent or parents. As used in this subdivision, "disa-
bility" means any physical or mental incapacity which renders the parent or par-
ents unable to adequately care for and control the child.
"(4) Whose parent or parents are convicted of a felony, if the facts of the
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several "descriptions" outlined in the statute. A petition will be war-
ranted if the child has been abandoned,8 9 abused,90 or neglected;91 if
the parent is "morally depraved"92 or debilitated by alcohol or drug
abuse;93 if the parent has been convicted of a particularly heinous
crime;94 if the parent is declared mentally ill or deficient, or is incapa-
ble of supporting or controlling the child because of the parent's mental
illness or deficiency. 95 In most cases, the children for whom the peti-
tion has been filed have previously been declared dependents of the
court.
9 6
Before the parent-child relationship may be permanently and ir-
revocably severed, 97 two distinct findings are required at the hearing.
First, an affirmative showing must be made that the child comes within
one of the "descriptions" of section 232; then the court must make the
added finding required by Civil Code section 4600 that an award of
custody to his parents would be "detrimental" to the child.98 While
termination proceedings, unlike dependency proceedings, are not for-
mally characterized as bifurcated, the practical effect of requiring both
the finding of neglect under section 232 and that of detriment under
section 4600 is closely analogous to the requirements of the jurisdic-
tional and dispositional stages of the dependency proceeding. By view-
crime of which such parent or parents were convicted are of such nature as to
prove the unfitness of such parent or parents to have the future custody and control
of the child.
"(5) Whose parent or parents have been declared by a court of competent
jurisdiction wherever situated to be mentally deficient or mentally ill, if, in the state
or country in which the parent or parents are hospitalized or resident, the Director
of Mental Health or the Director of Developmental Services, or his equivalent, if
any and the superintendent of the hospital of which, if any, such parent or parents
are inmates or patients certify that such parent or parents so declared to be men-
tally deficient or mentally ill will not be capable of supporting or controlling the
child in a proper manner.
"(6) Whose parent or parents are, and will remain incapable of supporting
or controlling the child in a proper manner because of mental deficiency or mental
illness, if there is testimony to this effect from two physicians and surgeons each of
which must have been certified either by the American Board of Psychiatry and
Neurology or under Section 6750 of the Welfare and Institutions Code .
89. CAL. CIV. CODE § 232(a)(1) (West Supp. 1978).
90. Id. § 232(a)(2).
91. Id.
92. Id. § 232(a)(3).
93. Id.
94. Id. § 232(a)(4).
95. Id. § 232(a)(5)-(6).
96. CALIFORNIA CHILDREN-WHO CARES?, supra note 23, at X-41.
97. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 238 (West Supp. 1978) (order severing parental rights is
permanent and irrevocable).
98. See note 103 & accompanying text infra.
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ing the findings made pursuant to sections 232 and 4600 as
jurisdictional and dispositional respectively, the issues involved in de-
termining the proper standards of proof required in termination pro-
ceedings can be analyzed more effectively.
Standards of Proof
The cases decided prior to In re B.G ,99 show that petitions
brought under Civil Code section 232 were adjudicated summarily. If
the child was found to come within the provisions of the statute, the
parents' rights could be immediately terminated.1°° Indeed, one case
held that the welfare of the child was not even a consideration in the
adjudication.' 0'
In 1963, however, Civil Code section 232.5,102 which provided that
the termination statute should be "liberally construed to serve and pro-
tect the interests and welfare of the child," was added to insure that the
interests of the child are the prime consideration in a determination
under section 232. In re B. G. reinforced this concept by requiring a
showing that severing parental ties is the disposition which will be the
"least detrimental" to the child's welfare.' 0 3
Whether or not one labels the findings under section 232 "jurisdic-
tional"'°4 and those made pursuant to section 4600 "dispositional", 0 5 it
99. 11 Cal. 3d 685, 523 P.2d 244, 114 Cal. Rptr. 444 (1974).
100. See, e.g., In re Neal, 265 Cal. App. 2d 482, 489, 71 Cal. Rptr. 300, 305 (1968); In re
Bisenius, 173 Cal. App. 2d 518, 522, 343 P.2d 319, 321 (1959). In Bisenius, the court held
that "the question is one of determining whether or not the child has been abandoned within
the meaning of said section [232], and is not one of making a wise selection between the
petitioner and the children's mother." Id.
101. "The future welfare of the child ... and the best interests of the child are not
issues in this proceeding." In re Bisenius, 173 Cal. App. 2d 518, 521-22, 343 P.2d 319, 321
(1959).
102. CAL. CrV. CODE § 232.5 (West Supp. 1978).
103. While the B. G. decision did not specifically indicate that the "detriment" showing
should be made in a termination proceeding, Civil Code § 4600 applies in "any proceeding"
where a court makes "any order awarding custody to a person or persons other than a par-
ent." Although § 4600 was enacted in 1969, it was not applied to termination proceedings
until after the B.G. decision. The finding made pursuant to § 4600 has now become known
as the "B.G. finding." See In re Rose G., 57 Cal. App. 3d 406, 417, 129 Cal. Rptr. 338, 345
(1976).
104. The likely legislative intent behind § 232 was to apply that statute only to make an
affirmative finding that a child came within a court's jurisdiction. Like Welfare & Institu-
tions Code § 300, § 232 outlines several "descriptions" of children for whom a petition may
be brought. Also, as originally enacted § 232(a) read, in pertinent part: "When any person
under the age of 21 years has been left by either or both of his parents in the care and
custody of another without any provision for his support, or without communication from
either or both of his parents for the period of six months, the petition provided for in Section
233 may be fied with respect to such person. Thejurisdiction of the court extends to such
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is clear that both of these findings must be made before termination of
the parent-child relationship can occur.'0 6 Furthermore, the trend of
recent cases seems to indicate that a specific finding of fact should be
made for both the "neglect" and the "detriment" elements, regardless
of whether such findings are requested. 107
At present, while most recent cases recognize that the separate
findings in dependency proceedings require different standards of
proof, none of the courts considering the issue has discussed requiring
different standards of proof for the separate findings in termination
proceedings. Instead, most of the cases talk of "the" standard of
proof1 0 8 required in termination proceedings and, for the most part,
seem to confuse the standard required for removal under Civil Code
section 4600 with the standard required to make the threshold finding
of "neglect" pursuant to section 232.
Since 1976, the courts of appeal have decided seven cases dealing
with standards of proof in termination proceedings. 0 9 Of these, the six
most recent cases hold the "clear and convincing" standard applicable
to findings under Civil Code section 232.110
person as fully as if such conditions had existed for a period of one year but no order or
judgment freeing such person from the custody and control of either or both of his parents
should be made until such conditions shall have existed for a period of at least one year."
Cal. Stat. 1961, ch. 1616, § 4, at 3501 (current version at CAL. CIV. CODE § 232(a)(1) (West
Supp. 1978)) (emphasis added).
105. See text accompanying notes 98-99 supra.
106. See In re Carmaleta B., 21 Cal. 3d 482, 579 P.2d 514, 146 Cal. Rptr. 623 (1978).
The court in Carmaleta B. held, in effect, that the scope of the reviewing court on appeal is
first, whether there is any substantial evidence to support the finding made pursuant to
§ 232, then, whether there is substantial evidence to support a finding that termination is the
"least detrimental alternative." Id. at 489, 579 P.2d at 518, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 627.
107. See id. at 493-96, 579 P.2d at 518, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 629-32; In re B.G., II Cal. 3d
685, 699, 523 P.2d 244, 258, 114 Cal. Rptr. 444, 458 (1974); In re Rose G., 57 Cal. App. 3d
406, 417, 129 Cal. Rptr. 338, 345 (1976); In re T.M.R., 41 Cal. App. 3d 694 704, 116 Cal.
Rptr. 292, 298 (1974).
108. See, e.g., In re Heidi T., 87 Cal. App. 3d 864, 151 Cal. Rptr. 263 (1978).
109. See In re David B., 91 Cal. App. 3d 184, - Cal. Rptr. - (1979); In re Heidi T., 87
Cal. App. 3d 864, 151 Cal. Rptr. 263 (1978); In re David E., 85 Cal. App. 3d 632, 150 Cal.
Rptr. 790 (1978); In re Terry D., 83 Cal. App. 3d 890, 148 Cal. Rptr. 221 (1978); In re
Cynthia K., 75 Cal. App. 3d 81, 141 Cal. Rptr. 875 (1977); In re George G., 68 Cal. App. 3d.
146, 137 Cal. Rptr. 201 (1977); In re Rose G., 57 Cal. App. 3d 406, 129 Cal. Rptr. 338 (1976).
110. In re Heidi T., 87 Cal. App. 3d 864, 151 Cal. Rptr. 263 (1978); In re Terry D., 83
Cal. App. 3d 890, 148 Cal. Rptr. 221 (1978); In re Cynthia K,, 75 Cal. App. 3d 81, 141 Cal.
Rptr. 875 (1977); In re George G., 68 Cal. App. 3d 146, 137 Cal. Rptr. 201 (1977). In re
David E., 85 Cal. App. 3d 632, 150 Cal. Rptr. 790 (1978) also held this standard of proof to
be applicable; however, since this case was decided under subdivision (a)(7) which expressly
calls for that standard to be applied, the case is not relevant to the issues raised in this Note.
The most recent case, In re David B., 91 Cal. App. 3d 184, - Cal. Rptr. - (1979), in dicta,
also required clear and convincing evidence, citing In re Heidi T., 87 Cal. App. 3d 864, 151
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 30
These opinions have created confusion regarding the proper stand-
ards of proof in termination proceedings by incorrectly assuming that
Robert P.'s holding, as to the proper standard of proof to invoke de-
pendency jurisdiction, is also applicable in determining the standard of
proof to be utilized in making a finding under Civil Code section 232.
This erroneous assumption has resulted in unfounded conclusions
about the applicable standard.
Typical is dictum in In re George G ' which stated that since
Robert P. required clear and convincing evidence to show that a child
comes within a court's dependency jurisdiction, "[ajfortiori, such a
standard would apply to parental termination pursuant to Civil Code
section 232."' 12 For the reasons discussed earlier," 3 the court's reli-
ance on In re Robert P. is simply not justified; the standard of proof to
invoke dependency jurisdiction is, by statute, a preponderance of the
evidence." "14
What was implied in George G. was more explicitly stated in In re
CynthiaK. 5 Relying on Robert P.'s holding that clear and convincing
evidence is required to make a finding pursuant to Welfare and Institu-
tions Code section 300, the court held:
[W]e can find no reason why a less stringent standard of proof should
be applied to a freedom from custody hearing where rights are totally
and permanently terminated, than would be applicable to a depen-
dency hearing under Welfare and Institutions Code section [3]00,
where temporary custody only is involved.
• . . The relative permanency of rights taken by a Welfare and
Institutions Code section [3]00 proceeding compels us to reject the
(preponderance of the evidence) standard .... The importance of
rights being terminated by this proceeding and the language of In re
B. G ... demand we call for the burden of proof to be clear and
convincing .... 116
It is not certain what conclusion the court would have reached had
it not relied upon the erroneous holding of In reRobert P. as its under-
lying premise. At least one inference that can be drawn by applying
the court's reasoning, however, is that since the court is not calling for
Cal. Rptr. 263 (1978) as controlling. 91 Cal. App. 3d at 194, - Cal. Rptr. at -. Because
this issue is discussed only cursorily in the opinion, the case will not be discussed at length in
this Note.
111. 68 Cal. App. 3d 146, 137 Cal. Rptr. 201 (1977).
112. Id. at 165 n.14, 137 Cal. Rptr. at 213.
113. See text accompanying notes 50-87 supra.
114. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 355 (West Supp. 1978). See note 48 & accompanying
text supra.
115. 75 Cal. App. 3d 81, 141 Cal. Rptr. 875 (1977).
116. Id. at 85-86, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 877-78.
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higher standards than those in dependency proceedings, the standard
of proof under Civil Code section 232 should be, like Welfare and In-
stitutions Code section 300, a preponderance of the evidence.
The Third District's decision in In re Terry D. 17 is unusual in that
it apparently recognized that section 232 deals only with grounds upon
which a court may assert its jurisdiction, yet it too held the clear and
convincing standard applicable. Acknowledging that a finding under
section 232 involves a "finding of the simple and single concept of cruel
treatment or neglect"'" 8 and does not necessarily mean that parental
rights will be terminated, the court goes on to hold that B. G. and AI-
sager require a finding under section 232 to be proven by clear and
convincing evidence. The court analogized a finding of neglect under
section 232(a)(2) with the finding of detriment under section 4600, but,
like the In re Cynthia K and In re George G. decisions, seemed to jus-
tify its holding because of the permanent nature of a termination
proceeding. " 9
In In re Heidi T,120 the First District, noting the "serious conse-
quences" of a termination proceeding and the number of recent cases
that required clear and convincing evidence pursuant to section 232,
held merely that "we are persuaded that the holdings in Cynthia K.,
George G., and Robert P. are soundly reasoned and should be fol-
lowed."' 21 Unfortunately, both George G. and Cynthia K. relied upon
Robert P. s rather unsound reasoning.
Unlike the more recent cases, the Second District opinion in In re
Rose G. 122 held that the standard of proof to be applied to prove the
factual allegation of "abandonment" pursuant to section 232(a)(1) is
"by a preponderance of the evidence." 23 As authority for this position,
Judge Jefferson cites Evidence Code section 115 which provides that
"[e]xcept as otherwise provided by law, the burden of proof requires
proof by a preponderance of the evidence."'' 2 4 The phrase "by law,"
however, refers to decisional law as well as to statutory law, 25 so the
split of authority in the appellate courts has effectively ruled out a de-
finitive ruling on this ground.
The other argument in support of the "preponderance" standard
117. 83 Cal. App. 3d 890, 148 Cal. Rptr. 221 (1978).
118. Id. at 896, 148 Cal. Rptr, at 224.
119. Id. at 898, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 225.
120. 87 Cal. App. 3d 864, 151 Cal. Rptr. 263 (1978).
121. Id. at 870, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 265. Accord, In re David B., 91 Cal. App. 3d 184, 194,
- Cal. Rptr. -, - (1979).
122. 57 Cal. App. 3d 406, 129 Cal. Rptr. 338 (1976).
123. Id. at 420, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 346.
124. CAL. EVID. CODE § 115 (West 1966).
125. See id., Comment by the Assembly Committee on Judiciary.
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made in the opinion is arguably more persuasive. Judge Jefferson
points out that although the legislature provided for an explicit stan-
dard of proof under section 232(a)(7),126 which applies only to children
placed in foster care homes for two or more consecutive years, no stan-
dard was set for the other subsections and, therefore, the legislature
must have intended the normal civil standard of proof to apply to
them. Indeed, what makes this argument even more persuasive is that
since 1976 when the In re Rose G. opinion was filed, the legislature has
changed the standard of proof for section 232(a)(7) three times-from
beyond a reasonable doubt, 27 to clear and convincing, 28 back to be-
yond a reasonable doubt 129 and, finally, back to clear and convinc-
ing.13o It would seem that if the legislature had intended section 232,
subsections (a)(1)-(a)(6) to require anything other than the preponder-
ance standard, it had ample opportunity to so provide.' 3'
Arguments for Applying the "Preponderance" Standard to
Section 232
There are several arguments concerning both the practicality of
applying a standard of clear and convincing evidence to findings under
section 232 and the social policies underlying that statute which should
be addressed in light of the recent appellate cases calling for the higher
standard. The impracticality of requiring clear and convincing evi-
dence to make a finding of "neglect" under Civil Code section 232 can
be demonstrated in many ways. For example, the recent California
Supreme Court case of In re Carmaleta B. 132 reiterated the holdings of
several appellate courts 33 that held that the circumstances which origi-
nally led to a finding of dependency under Welfare and Institutions
Code section 300 must be reviewed in light of subsequent events, to
126. Subdivision (a)(7) calls for a standard of clear and convincing evidence. See CAL.
CIV. CODE § 232(a)(7) (West Supp. 1978).
127. Cal. Stat. 1973, ch. 686, § I, at 1242.
128. Cal. Stat. 1976, ch. 940, § 2, at 2151.
129. Cal. Stat. 1977, ch. 1252, § 75 (effective July 1, 1978). This amendment was appar-
ently a clerical error.
130. Cal. Stat. 1978, ch. 429 § 23, at 415 (effective July 17, 1978). This amendment was
enacted to correct the 1977 amendment. See note 129, supra.
131. This argument was raised on appeal in a recent unreported case. See Brief for
Respondents at 13, In re Thelma M., No. I Civ. 43, 588 (Cal. App., District One, filed Aug.
28, 1978).
132. 21 Cal. 3d 482, 579 P.2d 514, 146 Cal. Rptr. 623 (1978).
133. In re Susan M., 53 Cal. App. 3d 300, 125 Cal. Rptr. 707 (1975); In re Morrow, 9
Cal. App. 3d 39, 88 Cal. Rptr. 142 (1970), rev'd on other grounds, Hollister Convalescent
Hosp. v. Rico, 15 Cal. 3d 660, 542 P.2d 1349, 125 Cal. Rptr. 757 (1975); In re Gano, 160 Cal.
App. 2d 700, 325 P.2d 485 (1958).
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determine whether these circumstances still persist at the time that the
section 232 petition is filed.' 34
In Carmaleta B., Carmaleta and her brothers and sisters were de-
clared dependent children of the juvenile court under Welfare and In-
stitutions Code section 600 (now 300), subdivision (d) because the
children had been "neglected" and "cruelly treated." The petition to
terminate parental custody and control was filed over one year later.
The Supreme Court concluded that in order to make a finding of abuse
and neglect at the termination proceeding, the trial court must consider
whether the circumstances of the parent which initially led to the child
being declared a dependent still exist.
The clear implication of Carmaleta B. is that the finding of "ne-
glect" or "abuse" is essentially the same finding that is made initially
by the juvenile court during the jurisdictional stage of the dependency
proceeding. Although it is necessary to take into account the parents'
current circumstances, it seems unreasonable to require in a section 232
proceeding any evidentiary standards other than those used in making
a finding of jurisdiction under Welfare and Institutions Code section
300.
In certain instances, the very language of Civil Code section 232
makes the application of the clear and convincing standard impractical.
For example, under subsection (a)(5), a petition may be brought to ter-
minate parental rights if the parent or parents "have been declared by a
court of competent jurisdiction . . . to be mentally deficient or men-
tally ill" and if "the superintendent of the hospital of which, if any,
such parent or parents are inmates or patients certify that such parent
or parents . . . will not be capable of supporting or controlling the
child in a proper manner."' 35
This subsection requires only the simple findings that the parent
has previously been declared mentally ill or deficient by a court, and
that a hospital administrator certify that the parent is "unfit." Requir-
ing a higher than normal standard of proof for these findings is unwar-
ranted. Because of the varying educational and training experiences
among different psychiatrists, 136 if the findings under subsection (a)(5)
is required to be proved by clear and convincing evidence, adjudication
under that subsection is likely to turn into a "battle of the experts."'' 37
134. 21 Cal. 3d at 494, 570 P.2d at 521, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 630.
135. CAL. CIv. CODE § 232(a)(5) (West Supp. 1978) (emphasis added).
136. Malmquist, The Role of Parental Mental Illness in Custody Proceedings, 2 FAM.
L.Q. 372 (1968).
137. See Kay & Phillips, Poverty and the Law of Child Custody, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 717,
723 (1966).
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The language of subsection (a)(5) however, expresses a legislative in-
tent to avoid just that.
Perhaps the most common and persuasive argument in the recent
appellate court opinions which require a clear and convincing standard
to be applied under section 232 is that which advocates the higher stan-
dard because of the more "permanent" and "drastic" nature of a termi-
nation proceeding. 38 There can be no dispute that an order which
terminates parental rights has a more permanent 139 effect than an order
made during a dependency proceeding which only temporarily severs
the relationship, nor can there by any doubt that termination " 'must be
viewed as a drastic remedy which should be resorted to only in extreme
cases.' "140 The consideration of this drastic effect is, however, a factor
to be ultilized in weighing the competing interests141 to determine
whether parental rights should be terminated; it should not be a consid-
eration in making the finding of whether the child fits one of the "de-
scriptions" of section 232. The determination of the extent to which
severence of parental rights will prove to have a drastic effect necessar-
ily involves a finding of whether returning the child to his parents
would be "detrimental" to the child's best interests and, thus, should
come into play only during the finding under section 4600, not during
the preliminary finding of neglect or abuse made pursuant to section
232.
The legislature has clearly expressed that the purpose of a termina-
tion proceeding is "to extend adoption services for the benefit of chil-
dren residing in foster homes at public expense 42 by facilitating legal
actions required for adoption so that these children may be placed in
adoptive homes where they will have the benefits of stability and secur-
ity.' 43 While termination is indeed a drastic remedy, foster care can
have even more serious consequences for the child than had he re-
mained with his "unfit" parents. 14 One of the problems with foster
care is that it is inherently temporary, and thus children in this position
138. See text accompanying notes 116-21 supra.
139. See note 97 supra.
140. In re Jacqueline H., 21 Cal. 3d 170, 177, 577 P.2d 683, 687, 145 Cal. Rptr. 548, 552
(1978) (citing In re T.M.R., 41 Cal. App. 3d 694, 703, 116 Cal. Rptr. 292, 298 (1974)).
141. The competing interests in any removal proceeding include those of the parents,
those of the child, and those of the state as parenspatriae. See Areen, Intervention Between
Parent and Child 4 Reappraisal of the State's Role in Child Neglect and .4buse Cases, 63
GEo. L.J. 887, 890 (1975).
142. It costs up to five times as much to rear a child born in 1970 in foster homes as it
would if the child were raised by natural or adoptive parents. CALIFORNIA CHILDREN-
WHO CARES, supra note 23, at X-32.
143. Cal. Stat. 1970, ch. 583, § I, at 1160.
144. Wald, supra note 20, at 642 n.94.
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will likely "feel the impermanency and insecurity of the arrangement
which clashes with [their] need for emotional constancy."'' 45 The
child's emotional development is likely to suffer also because, accord-
ing to statistics, at least half of those children placed in foster homes
will experience more than one placement with at least 20% experienc-
ing three placements or more. 146 A shortage of qualified, knowledgea-
ble families who can offer the nurturance which the neglected or
abused child so desperately needs compounds the problem. 147
By granting a petition to free a child from the custody and control
of his parents, the court may be simply terminating a relationship in
law which has already ended in fact. 148 Termination will quite often be
substantially less detrimental to the child than subjecting him to what
most probably seems to him to be an unending parade of probation
officers, social workers, and foster parents.
The application of a clear and convincing standard to the "juris-
dictional" finding of neglect under section 232 unnecessarily inhibits a
process by which a neglected or abused child can be freed for adoption
by parents better able or more willing to provide adequate care and
supervision. Perhaps this can best be demonstrated by an example. If
the statutorily mandated preponderance standard were to be upheld by
the California Supreme Court as the proper standard required to in-
voke dependency jurisdiction, a child who is declared to be a depen-
dent child due to parental neglect and is thus removed from the home
pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 300(d) faces a poten-
tially serious problem. If at the end of one year, a petition is brought
under Civil Code section 232(a)(2) to terminate parental rights because
of continued neglect by the parents, the conflict of the two standards
becomes evident. Although the evidence of neglect at the jurisdictional
phase of the dependency proceeding may have been sufficient to meet
the preponderance standard, and even though the evidence of neglect
at the termination hearing may be nearly identical, if the clear and con-
vincing standard is applied at the latter hearing, the evidence of neglect
may not be considered substantial enough to meet the higher standard.
The result is that the termination petition may be dismissed. Despite
the dismissal of this petition, the juvenile court may well decide that
the child's welfare requires that court to continue its dependency juris-
diction. The effect of all this is to maintain the child in limbo---the
145. J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE
CHILD 25 (1973).
146. Wald, supra note 20, at 645-46 n.107. See also Smith v. Organization of Foster
Families, 431 U.S. 816, 837 (1977).
147. CALIFORNIA CHILDREN-WHO CARES?, supra note 23, at X-35.
148. See Wald, supra note 20, at 688.
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state is under a duty to protect children from neglectful parents, yet it is
unable to provide the child with the stability of a permanent home.
Thus, what was intended to be a short-term removal for the protection
of the child becomes long-term custodial care.
The application of the preponderance standard to Civil Code sec-
tion 232 not only more aptly suits the practical application of that stat-
ute, but also is consistent with prevailing social policies which mandate
that the state, as parenspatriae, intervene on behalf of children who
have been neglected or abused. Finally, the preponderance standard in
all likelihood reflects the California Legislature's intent behind the
original enactment of section 232 and also meets the recent recommen-
dations of the National Council of Juvenile Court Judges.149
Proposals for Legislative Reform
In order to make the intervention system work more fairly and
efficiently, the legislature should take several steps not only to settle the
question of the proper standards of proof in removal proceedings, but
also to solve several tangentially related problems as well. The most
important step would be to prescribe specific standards of proof for
Civil Code section 232. Such legislation would end the confusion in
this area and would provide necessary guidelines for both the judiciary
and the parties involved in proceedings under the statute.
Secondly, the legislature should adopt a statutory presumption of
abuse in termination proceedings where a child has suffered aphysical
injury or harmful condition and it is apparent that the injury or condi-
tion is the result of the abusive or neglectful acts of the parent. This
presumption should parallel those which already exist in connection
with dependency proceedings. 50 A statutory provision to this effect is
essential because of the perilous, often deadly results of child abuse and
the intrinsic difficulty of producing solid evidence of such abuse.
Child abuse is now the major killer of children in the United
149. Lincoln, Model Statutefor Termination of Parental Rights, 27 Juv. CT. JUDGES J.,
Nov. 1976, at 3, 6. See also INSTITUTE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION & AMERICAN BAR
ASSOCIATION, JOINT COMMISSION ON JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS, STANDARDS RELAT-
ING TO ABUSE AND NEGLECT (tent. draft 1977). The Standards provide for automatic termi-
nation of parental rights, in most cases, after the child has been removed from home for a
prescribed period. At the initial removal proceeding, the petitioner must show both the
abuse or neglect and that the child would be "endangered" if allowed to remain in the home
(in effect, the "detriment" finding). In cases of abuse these findings are to be proved by a
preponderance of the evidence; in nonabuse cases the "clear and convincing" standard is to
be utilized. If these standards were adopted in California, the necessity of applying a clear
and convincing standard to the "B.G. finding" would be abrogated in cases of physical
abuse.
150. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 355.1-.4 (West Supp. 1978).
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States.' 5 ' Like most states, California provides for mandatory report-
ing by physicians of suspected abuse, 152 yet it is often quite difficult for
a doctor to determine whether an injury was intentionally inflicted. 53
Since most incidents of abuse or neglect occur in the privacy of the
home, 154 there are seldom outsiders able or willing to testify. When a
child is a victim of an abusive or neglectful parent or parents, he is
quite often likely to be too frightened or too immature to provide com-
petent information about the incident. The difficulty of producing
solid, credible evidence of abuse or neglect is often compounded by the
fact that many county probation offices are overworked and under-
staffed and effective and timely investigations of complaints cannot be
conducted. 155
Apparently in recognition of the difficulty of proof inherent in re-
moval proceedings, the California Legislature has adopted statutes
which incorporate the tort doctrine of res Opsa loquitur in dependency
proceedings to establish, with the aid of expert testimony, prima facie
evidence that a child has been neglected or abused by the parents. 56
151. R. KALMAR, CHILD ABUSE: PERSPECTIVES ON DIAGNOSIS, TREATMENT AND PRE-
VENTION iii (1977). Child abuse is estimated to cause as many as 50,000 deaths per year. Id.
152. CAL. PENAL CODE § 11161.5 (West Supp. 1979). The statute provides that the fol-
lowing persons report by telephone and in writing within 36 hours after having observed a
child who has been a victim of child abuse to both the police and juvenile probation depart-
ment, or to either the county health department or welfare department: physicians, dentists,
residents, interns, podiatrists, chiropractors, religious practitioners, school nurses, teachers,
school principals, licensed day care workers, day camp administrators, social workers, and
probation officers. Failure to report is a misdemeanor; however, underreporting by these
professionals appears to be a serious problem. See Goodpaster & Angel, Child Abuse and
the Law- The California System, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 1081, 1094-1116 (1975).
153. Wald, State Intervention on Behalf of "Neglected" Children.- A Search for Realistic
Standards, 27 STAN. L. REV. 985, 1010 (1975). Where an incident of child abuse goes undis-
covered it is estimated that in 25% to 50% of such cases, the child will be permanently in-
jured or killed in the next several months. See Heifer, The Responsibility and Role of the
Physician, in THE BATTERED CHILD, 43, 51 (Heifer & Kempe eds. 1968).
154. Brown, Fox & Hubbard, Medical and Legal Aspects of the Battered Child Syn-
drome, 50 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 45-69 (1973).
155. See, e.g., McCathren, Accountability in the Child Protection System. A Defense of the
Proposed Standards Relating to Abuse and Neglect, 57 B.U. L. REV. 707, 717-19 (1977). In
California, the average caseload of social workers in each county varies between 25 and 68
families. Id. at 718 n.47.
156. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 355.1-355.4 (West Supp. 1978). Section 355.1 is typi-
cal of its companion statutes. It reads: "Where the court finds, based upon competent pro-
fessional evidence, that an injury, injuries, or detrimental condition sustained by a minor, of
such a nature as would ordinarily not be sustained except as the result of the unreasonable
or neglectful acts or omissions of either parent, the guardian, or other person who has the
care or custody of the minor, such evidence shall be prima facie evidence of the minor's need
of proper and effective parental care, and such proof shall be sufficient to support a finding
that the minor is described by subdivision (a) of Section 300." The rebuttable presumptions
created by these statutes affect the burden of producing evidence. Id. § 355.6.
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Unfortunately, there is no statute creating similar presumptions in ter-
mination proceedings. 57 As previously discussed, 158 the finding of
abuse or neglect during a section 232 proceeding is, in most cases, es-
sentially the same finding made pursuant to Welfare and Institutions
Code section 300. Thus, the same evidentiary standards, including the
use of circumstantial evidence to create a presumption that a child has
been neglected or abused in cases where the child has suffered a nonac-
cidental physical injury, should be applied at both hearings. 159
The legislature should facilitate the finding of detriment under sec-
tion 4600 in a similar manner in cases of child abuse. Once it has been
proven by a preponderance of the evidence that a child has been physi-
cally harmed by an abusive or neglectful parent in either a proceeding
commenced under Civil Code section 232 or Welfare and Institutions
Code section 300, a presumption should arise that returning custody of
the child to the parents would be detrimental to the child's welfare and
best interests.160 The application of this common sense inference is jus-
tified where a child has been harmed by the abusive or neglectful acts
of the parents because of the inherent relationship between the harm
suffered by the child and the legal determination of whether the home
environment is detrimental to the child.
A fourth proposal involves amending Civil Code section 232 to
require under all subsections of that statute that, before parental rights
can be terminated, a showing be made that prior to the filing of the
petition the child had been a dependent of the court and placed in fos-
ter care for at least one year. At present, subsections (1), (2), and (3) of
section 232(a) include this requirement, but subsections (4) through (6),
which deal with children whose parents are convicted felons, mentally
ill or mentally deficient, do not require that the child for whom the
petition has been brought has previously been removed from parental
custody.' 61
Because of the high degree of speculation that is involved in the
157. Civil Code § 232(a)(1) does, however, provide for such a presumption to show an
intent of the parents to abandon the child. See In re Rose G., 57 Cal. App. 3d 406, 418-20,
129 Cal. Rptr. 338, 345-47 (1976). See note 88 supra.
158. See text accompanying notes 132-34 supra.
159. Professor Wald suggests a lower standard of proof should be applied where physi-
cal abuse has occurred. See Wald, supra note 19, at 654. Because of the split of authority
concerning the standards of proof in California removal proceedings, however, it seems that
implementation of this proposal to the existing removal statutes could create even more
confusion than already exists. The effect of both proposals is, of course, similar.
160. Because of the social policy of protecting children from abusive parents, this pre-
sumption should probably be one affecting the burden of proof. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 605
(West Supp. 1979).
161. See note 88 supra.
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latter subsections concerning what effect the parents' present status will
have on the child in the future, and the corresponding degree of subjec-
tivity inherent in making a determination under those subsections, it
seems that allowing termination without first placing the child in tem-
porary foster care "in most cases is too drastic a policy."'1 62
Finally, the legislature should consider redrafting those statutes
which allow the state to intervene on behalf of neglected children, in
order to guard against constitutional challenges similar to those raised
in Alsager v. District Court of Polk County, Iowa. 163 Both Welfare and
Institutions Code section 300 and Civil Code section 232 tend to be
extremely broad and vague regarding the bases for intervention. For
example, under section 300, a petition may be brought to declare a
child a dependent of the court if he or she is "destitute" or not provided
with a "suitable place of abode."1 64 Similarly, under Civil Code sec-
tion 232, a petition may be brought to terminate parental rights if the
child's parents are "morally depraved"' 165 or if they have been con-
victed of a felony of "such nature as to prove the unfitness of such
parent or parents .... ," 66 The deficiencies in this language are mani-
fest; the ability of these provisions to withstand a constitutional chal-
lenge seems questionable. Furthermore, rather than defining
jurisdiction in terms of specific harms to the child, both of the statutes
focus on parental behavior despite the apparent shift in emphasis in
recent years from the "unfitness" of the parent to the detrimental con-
sequence of returning the child to the home. 167
Conclusion
Some California courts of appeal have erroneously concluded that
the standard of proof necessary to make a finding under Civil Code
section 232 is the "clear and convincing evidence" standard. Since the
standards for termination of parental rights should relate to the stand-
ards for temporary removal of the child and because, in most instances,
the findings made under either Welfare and Institutions Code section
300 or Civil Code section 232 will be essentially the same, the "prepon-
derance" standard should be the standard of proof used to determine
162. Wald, supra note 20, at 693. In Alsager v. District Court of Polk County, Iowa, 406
F. Supp. 10 (S.D. Iowa 1975), afi'dpercuriam, 545 F.2d 1137 (8th Cir. 1976), the order of the
state court was held unconstitutional, in part, because of the state's failure to consider "less
drastic" alternatives to termination. See note 69 & accompanying text supra.
163. 406 F. Supp. 10 (S.D. Iowa 1975), afdper curiam, 545 F.2d 1137 (8th Cir. 1976).
164. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 300(b) (West Supp. 1978).
165. CAL. CIv. CODE § 232(a)(3) (West Supp. 1978).
166. Id. § 232(a)(4).
167. See text accompanying note 63 supra.
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whether the child fits the "descriptions" of those statutes. The applica-
tion of the "clear and convincing" standard is simply not practical in
some instances. Further, such a standard is not warranted under pre-
vailing social policies.
The drastic nature of state intervention into family relationships
mandates that the statutes governing the removal of a child from his
home be drafted with such clarity and specificity that there can be no
doubt regarding the grounds upon which the state may intervene on
behalf of a neglected child. To achieve this end, the legislature should
closely scrutinize the language of Welfare and Institutions Code section
300 and Civil Code section 232 and should enact new legislation to
insure that evidentiary matters do not condemn a child to remaining in
a family environment which endangers his welfare.

